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1 Introduction
There are lots of common phenomena during the Great Depression in the
United States and the recent long-run stagnation in Japan, both of which
Krugman (1998) mentions as a liquidity trap. During the Great Depression,
for example, the US unemployment rate rose from 3.2 percent in 1929 to a
peak of 25.2 percent in 1933 and stayed higher than 10 percent for several
years. Deflation occurred, nominal interest rates declined to nearly zero
and excess reserves held by commercial banks expanded.1 Under the recent
stagnation in Japan the unemployment rate rose from 2.1 percent in 1990
to a peak of 5.4 percent in 2002 and is still around 4.0 percent (see figure
1). Deflation has continued (figure 2), and nominal interest rates have been
nearly zero (figure 3).2 And commercial banks held extensive excess reserves,
which increased up to about six times as much as required by the Bank of
Japan (figure 4).
These phenomena have again been observed in the United States since
2008. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate has sharply increased from
4.9 percent in January 2008 to 7.2 percent in December 2008, and a monthly
change in the consumer price index for all urban consumers has been negative
or zero from August to December in 2008 (see the Bureau of Labor Statistics
of the US Department of Labor). The federal funds rate has been decreased
to nearly zero and excess reserves have massively expanded from 1.991 billion
dollars in August 2008 to 767.412 billion dollars in December 2008 (see the
1See, e.g., Mankiw (2002, chapter 11, table 11-2) and Orphanides (2004, figures 1 and 2)
for the transitions of price levels, unemployment rates and nominal interest rates. For the
fall in nominal interest rates, see also Temin (1976, chapter 4, figures 4 and 5). Moreover,
see Orphanides (2004, figure 3 (b)) and Wilcox (1984, table 1) for the increase in excess
reserves.
2See, e.g., Fujiki, Okina and Shiratsuka (2001, figure 1) and Orphanides (2004, figure 4)
for the movements of the policy interest rate and nominal rates of interest on government
bonds.
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).3
Under such serious stagnation people tend to hold more cash and deposits
than required for transactions –i.e., people have various motives of holding
cash or deposits besides the transaction motive. Otani and Suzuki (2008) find
that the volume of banknotes in circulation held by Japanese households for
non-transaction motives increased from around 1 or 5 trillion yen in 1995
to around 30 trillion yen in 2007, that 70 percent of the total increase in
banknotes in circulation from 1995 to 2007 was due to the increase in non-
transaction demand, and that people held 120 trillion yen out of 310 trillion
yen in demand deposits for such motives in 2007.
We analyze the phenomena that occurred during the stagnation periods
in the US and Japan, using a model where both cash and interest-bearing
deposits yield utility of liquidity a` la Romer (1985) and Jones et al. (2004).4
We find that there are a certain value of the marginal utility of cash and
a certain amount of full-employment output that divide the case of persis-
tent unemployment from that of full employment. If the marginal utility of
cash is less than the critical value, or equivalently if full-employment output
is smaller than the critical amount, full employment obtains and nominal
interest rates are positive in a steady state. If otherwise, nominal interest
rates are zero and the marginal benefit of cash exceeds that of consumption,
which makes people consume less than required to reach full employment and
causes persistent unemployment and deflation to occur. Since it is indifferent
3The Federal Open Market Committee decided to control the federal funds rate in a
range from zero to 0.25 percent in December 16, 2008.
4There are other approaches that consider liquidity of both cash and deposits. For
example, Walsh (1984) extends a cash-in-advance model to a model where individuals
must have cash and deposits in advance of buying goods. Simonsen and Cysne (2001)
present a model in which both cash and deposits reduce transaction costs. However,
these models are not suitable for treating money demand motivated by factors other than
transactions.
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for commercial banks to hold reserves and interest-bearing assets under the
zero nominal interest rates, they hold excess reserves, which lowers monetary
aggregates and the money multiplier.
In the literature there are two well-known hypotheses about the cause of
the Great Depression: the spending hypothesis (viz. the IS effect) and the
money hypothesis (viz. the LM effect).5 Our paper emphasizes the monetary
side of an economy and shows that excessive demand for cash yields persistent
stagnation, as mentioned by the money hypothesis. However, the stagnation
occurs – not because excessive demand for cash reduces monetary aggregates,
raises interest rates and decreases investment – but because it absorbs pur-
chasing power that would otherwise be directed toward consumption. Thus,
our paper is more in conformity with the spending hypothesis than with the
money hypothesis.
The stagnation mechanism of our model also differs from that of the
liquidity trap model of Krugman (1998). By assuming rigid prices in the
first period and perfect price adjustment that realizes full employment in
the second period, he insists that deflation and zero nominal interest rates
raise real interest rates and therefore reduce current consumption as a result
of people’s intertemporal decision making.6 Thus, stagnation is a short-run
phenomenon in his setting. In our paper, in contrast, excessive demand for
cash yields a shortage of consumption as a result of people’s intratemporal
preference between consumption and liquidity of cash and stagnation is a
steady-state phenomenon.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3
5See, e.g., Mankiw (2002, chapter 11) for a brief description on the two hypotheses.
6It seems that this mechanism is not consistent with Japan’s recent slump. In fact,
Baba et al. (2005, figure 4) show that Japan’s real interest rates did not remarkably rise
for the years 1991-2003 and slowly declined for the mid 1990s-2003.
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describe the structure and the dynamics of the model respectively. Whereas
section 4 discusses the case where full employment is reached in a steady
state, section 5 analyzes the case of persistent unemployment. In this case
deflation occurs, nominal interest rates decline to zero, commercial banks
hold excess reserves and the money multiplier approaches unity. Section 6
concludes. Stability analyses are set out in appendices.
2 The Model
The private sector consists of a representative firm, a representative com-
mercial bank and a representative household. There are two assets, money
and government bonds. Money is held by the household and the commercial
bank whereas all government bonds are held by the commercial bank.7
2.1 The Representative Firm and the Government
We assume that the representative firm uses only labor to produce a com-
modity and that the labor productivity is constant, which we call y. Given
real wage wt the firm chooses labor demand l
d
t as follows:
ldt = 0 if y < wt
(
≡ Wt
Pt
)
,
0 < ldt < ∞ if y = wt, (1)
ldt = ∞ if y > wt,
where Wt and Pt are the nominal wage and the nominal commodity price
respectively.
A monetary authority keeps nominal monetary base Mt constant:
Mt = M.
7In Japan most of government bonds are indeed held by Japanese financial institutions.
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A fiscal authority finances payments of interest on government bonds, RtBt,
where Bt and Rt denote nominal government bonds and the nominal rate of
interest on government bonds respectively, by issuing new government bonds
B˙t and collecting lump-sum tax τt:
B˙t + Ptτt = RtBt,
where the initial stock of nominal government bonds, B0, is historically given.
Let πt (≡ P˙t/Pt), bt (≡ Bt/Pt) and rt (≡ Rt − πt) denote the inflation rate,
real government bonds and the real rate of interest on government bonds
respectively. Then the government’s real budget equation is
b˙t + τt = rtbt.
The fiscal authority follows a Ricardian rule:
τt = rtbt + θ(bt − b), θ > 0, b > 0,
where b is a target level of real government bonds.8 This rule yields the
following simple dynamic equation of bt:
b˙t = −θ(bt − b), (2)
implying that bt converges to b.
2.2 The Representative Commercial Bank
The representative commercial bank collects nominal deposits Dt and holds
government bonds Bt so as to gain interest revenues RtBt. As assumed in
Walsh (1984) and Romer (1985), the monetary authority requires the bank
8This rule is imposed basically for the validity of the no-Ponzi game condition of the
government. See, e.g., Woodford (2001) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) for similar
assumptions.
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to keep the reserve-deposit ratio higher than a fixed level, which we shall call
:
MBt ≥ Dt, 0 <  < 1, (3)
where MBt denotes nominal reserve holdings. The bank maximizes its profit:
RtBt −RDt Dt,
where RDt is the nominal rate of interest on deposits, subject to reserve
requirement (3) and the balance sheet:
Bt + M
B
t = Dt. (4)
The Lagrange function for the profit-maximization problem is given by
Lt = RtBt −RDt Dt + κt(MBt − Dt) + δt(Dt − Bt −MBt ),
where κt and δt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (3) and (4)
respectively. The first-order conditions are
Rt = δt,
κt = δt,
RDt = δt − κt,
κt ≥ 0, MBt − Dt ≥ 0, κt(MBt − Dt) = 0.
(5)
When Rt > 0, the bank reduces reserves to the minimum level and con-
sequently (3) is binding (κt > 0). From (3)-(5), we therefore obtain
RDt = (1− )Rt > 0, Dt =
Bt
1− , M
B
t =

1− Bt. (6)
When Rt = 0, it is indifferent for the bank to hold reserves and interest-
bearing assets. Thus, (3) is not binding (κt = 0) and no equation of (6) is
valid. From (5) where κt = 0, we find
Rt = R
D
t = 0.
We formally state this property:
7
Lemma 1. Rt = R
D
t = 0 if and only if (3) is not binding.
2.3 The Representative Household
Following Romer (1985) and Jones et al. (2004), we assume that the repre-
sentative household’s utility depends on consumption ct, real cash holdings
mHt (≡ MHt /Pt) where MHt is the nominal value of mHt , and real deposit
holdings dt (≡ Dt/Pt). The household maximizes the following lifetime util-
ity:
∫ ∞
0
[
u(ct) + V (m
H
t , dt)
]
exp(−ρt)dt,
where ρ (> 0) is the subjective discount rate, u(ct) is the utility of consump-
tion and V (mHt , dt) is the utility of liquidity. They satisfy normal properties:
u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0, u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0;(
∂V
∂mHt
≡
)
Vm(·, ·) > 0,
(
∂2V
∂mHt
2 ≡
)
Vmm(·, ·) < 0,
Vm(0, dt) = ∞, Vm(∞, dt) = 0;(
∂V
∂dt
≡
)
Vd(·, ·) > 0,
(
∂2V
∂dt
2 ≡
)
Vdd(·, ·) < 0,
Vd(m
H
t , 0) = ∞, Vd(mHt ,∞) = 0.
(7)
V (mHt , dt) is further assumed to be linear homogeneous and hence marginal
utility of cash Vm(m
H
t , dt) and that of deposits Vd(m
H
t , dt) depend on m
H
t /dt:
9
Vm(m
H
t , dt) ≡ vm(xt), Vd(mHt , dt) ≡ vd(xt),
where xt is the cash-deposit ratio defined such that
xt ≡ m
H
t
dt
. (8)
9Similarly, Jones et al. (2004) assume a constant elasticity of substitution function of
cash and deposits.
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The properties given in (7) imply vm(xt) and vd(xt) to satisfy
v′m(xt) < 0, vm(0) = ∞, vm(∞) = 0;
v′d(xt) > 0, vd(0) = 0, vd(∞) = ∞.
(9)
The household’s assets at consist of cash m
H
t and deposits dt:
at = m
H
t + dt. (10)
Note that there is no equity since the firm value is zero under the linear
technology. The flow budget equation is
a˙t = r
D
t dt − πtmHt + wtlt − ct − τt, (11)
where rDt is the real rate of interest on deposits:
rDt ≡ RDt − πt (12)
and lt is the realized amount of labor supply. The household’s labor sup-
ply is inelastic and normalized to unity, but it may not be fully employed.
Therefore, realized labor supply lt is determined by the short side of labor
demand and supply:
lt = min
{
ldt , 1
}
. (13)
The first-order conditions for the utility-maximization problem subject
to (10) and (11) are
u′(ct) = λt,
−πtλt + vm(xt) = γt,
rDt λt + vd(xt) = γt,
λ˙t − ρλt = −γt,
(14)
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where λt is the co-state variable associated with (11) and γt is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (10). The transversality condition is
lim
t→∞
λtat exp(−ρt) = 0. (15)
From (12) and (14) we obtain
ρ + η(ct)
c˙t
ct
+ πt =
vm(xt)
u′(ct)
= RDt +
vd(xt)
u′(ct)
, (16)
where η(ct) ≡ −u′′(ct)ct/u′(ct). The left-hand side of (16) is the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution of consumption measured in nominal terms, the
middle is the marginal benefit of cash given by the intratemporal marginal
rate of substitution between cash and consumption, and the right-hand side
is the marginal benefit of deposits given by the sum of the nominal rate
of interest on deposits and the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
between deposits and consumption.
3 The Dynamics
We obtain the dynamics of the present economy from all agents’ behavior
presented in the previous section. The money market equilibrium condition
is
MHt + M
B
t = M. (17)
Adjustment of nominal wage Wt is assumed to be sluggish:
W˙t
Wt
= α(ldt − 1), (18)
where α (> 0) is exogenous and constant and W0 is historically given.
10 In
contrast, commodity price Pt perfectly adjusts. Thus, the second equation
10Many economists have long explored how nominal or real wages adjust. Although this
issue is still interesting and important, we assume a simple adjustment process because
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of (1) is valid at any point in time:
Wt
Pt
= y for ∀t, (19)
and the commodity market is always in equilibrium
ct = ylt, (20)
where from (13)
lt = l
d
t ≤ 1. (21)
Note that y can be taken as full-employment output since the representative
household’s labor endowment is unity.
From (18)-(21) we find πt to be
πt = α
(
ct
y
− 1
)
. (22)
Since Mt is constant at M , the dynamic equation of real money balances
mt (≡ M/Pt) is
m˙t
mt
= −πt = −α
(
ct
y
− 1
)
. (23)
From the second and third equations of (6), (8), the second equality of
(16), and (17), cash-deposit ratio xt is
xt = (1− )mt
bt
−  ≡ x(mt, bt) if RDt > 0,
xt = x˜ if R
D
t = 0,
(24)
our purpose is not to analyze why wages are rigid but to show why unemployment persists
even though wages continue to adjust, as was the case under the Great Depression of
the 1930s and Japan’s recent slump. If wages instantaneously adjust so that demand
always matches supply in the labor market, the possibility of unemployment is intrinsically
avoided. However, it can be shown that there is no equilibrium path under such perfect
wage adjustment if a liquidity preference for cash is excessive and/or if full-employment
output is large (see section 5). Moreover, it is known that the original Phillips curve holds
well in Japan (see, e.g., Smith, 2008).
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where x˜ satisfies
vm(x˜) = vd(x˜). (25)
Note that x˜ is uniquely determined under the properties in (9). From (24) and
(25), we find that in contrast to the standard money-in-the-utility-function
model the marginal utility of cash is positive even when nominal interest
rates RDt and Rt are zero. It is because from (16) both cash and deposits
yield utility of liquidity and RDt merely fills the gap between the liquidity
premiums of the two.
The first equality of (16), (22) and (24) give the dynamic equation of ct:
c˙t
ct
= σ(ct)
[
−α
(
ct
y
− 1
)
+
vm(x(mt, bt))
u′(ct)
− ρ
]
if RDt > 0,
c˙t
ct
= σ(ct)
[
−α
(
ct
y
− 1
)
+
vm(x˜)
u′(ct)
− ρ
]
if RDt = 0,
(26)
where σ(ct) ≡ 1/η(ct). (2), (23) and (26) characterize the dynamic behavior
of the present economy.
4 The Full Employment Steady State
This section shows that full employment obtains and nominal interest rates
R and RD are positive in a steady state if
ρ >
vm(x˜)
u′(y)
. (27)
In the full employment steady state, from (20), (23) and the first equation
of (26),
c = y, l = 1, π = 0, ρ =
vm(x
∗)
u′(y)
, (28)
where x∗ denotes the cash-deposit ratio in this state and is uniquely deter-
mined owing to the properties of vm(·) in (9).
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Since v′m(x) < 0 and v
′
d(x) > 0 as shown by (9), equations (25) and (27)
and the last equation of (28) yield
x∗ < x˜, ρ =
vm(x
∗)
u′(y)
>
vm(x˜)
u′(y)
=
vd(x˜)
u′(y)
>
vd(x
∗)
u′(y)
.
Therefore, from (6) and (16), the nominal interest rates are positive:
RD = (1− )R = vm(x
∗)
u′(y)
− vd(x
∗)
u′(y)
> 0. (29)
Since the cash-deposit ratio is given by the last equation of (28) and lemma
1 implies that reserve requirement (3) is binding in this state, (2), (6), (8)
and (17) yield
b = b, d =
b
1− , m
H =
x∗b
1− , m
B =
b
1− , m =
(x∗ + )b
1−  . (30)
Using d, mH and m given in (30) we find the money multiplier to be larger
than unity:
MH + D
M
(
=
mH + d
m
)
=
x∗ + 1
x∗ + 
> 1.
Moreover, as shown in appendix A, there is a unique path converging to
the full employment steady state. Thus we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The economy converges to the full employment steady state
represented by (28)-(30) if (27) holds.
5 The Unemployment Steady State
In the previous section we find that under (27) full employment is eventually
reached, in other words, unemployment is a short-run phenomenon. However,
unemployment often lasts long, as did under the Great Depression in the
1930s and Japan’s lost decade. This section shows that if (27) is invalid, i.e.,
ρ <
vm(x˜)
u′(y)
, (31)
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persistent unemployment occurs, the nominal interest rates are zero, defla-
tion lasts, excess reserves are held by the commercial bank and the money
multiplier equals unity in a steady state.11 (31) implies that the marginal
benefit of cash (the right-hand side) exceeds that of consumption (the left-
hand side) if consumption is large enough to realize full employment. It is
valid if either labor productivity y (which equals full-employment output) or
marginal utility of cash vm is large enough.
From (9) and (31), x˜ in (25) and x∗ in (28) satisfy
x∗ > x˜, ρ =
vm(x
∗)
u′(y)
<
vm(x˜)
u′(y)
=
vd(x˜)
u′(y)
<
vd(x
∗)
u′(y)
,
which implies that if x is determined so that it equates the marginal benefit
of cash to that of consumption under full employment then the nominal rate
of interest on deposits must be negative:
RD =
vm(x
∗)
u′(y)
− vd(x
∗)
u′(y)
< 0.
If RD < 0, however, the commercial bank can unlimitedly increase its profit
by collecting deposits and holding reserves, which increases the bank’s de-
mand for deposits to infinity. RD therefore rises up to zero, and consequently
RD = 0, R = 0. (32)
In this state excess reserves are held by the commercial bank, as stated by
lemma 1, and the cash-deposit ratio is
x = x˜, (33)
11We ignore the infinitesimal possibility that neither (27) nor (31) is valid, that is,
ρ =
vm(x˜)
u′(y)
.
In the steady state of this case, the zero nominal interest rates and full employment go
together.
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as shown by (24).
From (31) and (33), the last equation of (28) is obviously invalid and
hence the full employment steady state is unreachable. From the second
equation of (26) we obtain
ρ + α
(
c
y
− 1
)
=
vm(x˜)
u′(c)
, (34)
instead of the last equation of (28). Under (31) the left-hand side of (34) is
smaller than the right-hand side if c = y. Thus, in order for c that satisfies
(34) to exist uniquely within (0, y) the left-hand side of (34) must be larger
than the right-hand side if c = 0, i.e.,
ρ > α. (35)
From (31) and (35), the slope of the right-hand side of (34) must be steeper
than that of the left-hand side at the value of c satisfying (34):
α
y
< −vm(x˜)u
′′(c)
[u′(c)]2
. (36)
As shown in appendix B, (36) assures the saddle-path stability in the neigh-
borhood of the present steady state and hence there is a unique path to reach
the steady state.
Let us summarize the present mechanism of persistent unemployment.
Since RD cannot be negative, it is stuck at zero, which makes x equal x˜
and vm(x) equal vm(x˜). Since the marginal benefit of cash exceeds that of
consumption (viz. the time preference rate) under full employment, as shown
by (31), the household reduces consumption to less than full-employment
output y in order to hold more cash. Hence persistent unemployment arises
(from (20) and (21) l = ld < 1 under c < y).12
12Ono (1994, 2001) finds that an aggregate demand shortage and unemployment occur
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From (23) where c < y, deflation arises and real money balances continue
to increase:
m˙
m
= −π > 0. (37)
Using (2), (4), (8), (17), (33) and (37) we find
b = b, d =
m + b
1 + x˜
= ∞, mH = x˜
(
m + b
)
1 + x˜
= ∞, mB = m− x˜b
1 + x˜
= ∞.
(38)
From (34) and (38), deflation continues to expand real cash and deposit
holdings but does not stimulate consumption –i.e., the Pigou effect does not
work.13
From (17) and the second and fourth properties of (38) we obtain
MB
D
= lim
m→∞
1− x˜b/m
1 + b/m
= 1, MH + D = MH + MB = M, (39)
which shows that the money multiplier approaches unity and monetary ag-
gregates MH + D decline to monetary base M .
Since (4), (10) and (17) yield
a (= mH + d) = m + b,
from (37) and (38) we find
a˙
a
=
m˙/m
1 + b/m
+
b˙/b
m/b + 1
=
m˙
m
= −π.
as a steady-state phenomenon if there is a positive lower bound for the marginal utility of
money. See also Matsuzaki (2003), Hashimoto (2004), Johdo (2006, 2008a, 2008b), Ono
(2006), Rodriguez-Arana (2007) and Johdo and Hashimoto (2009) for the same type of
unemployment. Whereas they assume the marginal utility of money to remain positive,
we do not assume it and nevertheless persistent unemployment occurs. In our paper
the nonnegativity of nominal interest rates causes the marginal utility of money to stay
positive.
13Ono (1994, 2001) also finds that the Pigou effect does not work under insatiable
liquidity preference.
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Time differentiation of the first equation of (14), the first equality of (16)
and the above property lead to
lim
t→∞
λ˙t
λt
+
a˙t
at
− ρ = lim
t→∞
−η(ct) c˙t
ct
− π − ρ = −vm(x˜)
u′(c)
< 0,
implying that transversality condition (15) is satisfied although m perma-
nently expands.14
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The economy reaches the unemployment steady state char-
acterized by (32)-(34), (37) and (38) if (31) and (35) are valid.
As observed during the Great Depression in the US and the recent stag-
nation in Japan, unemployment persists, leading to deflation, and nominal
interest rates RD and R are zero, causing the commercial bank to hold ex-
cess reserves. Moreover, the latter is supported by some empirical papers.
For example, Wilcox (1984) attributes 80 percent of the increase in excess
reserves during the Great Depression to a significant fall in interest rates.
Ogawa (2007) reports a similar result in Japan of the late 1990s.
The result shown by (39) is also consistent with both stagnation periods.
For instance, Wheelock (1992, figure 10) illustrates a significant fall in the
money multiplier during the Great Depression, and figure 5 exhibits a similar
phenomenon that occurred during Japan’s recent stagnation. In the present
steady state the contraction in monetary aggregates is not the cause but
the result of slump. This causality is opposite to the money hypothesis a` la
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) but the same as Temin (1976) and Krugman
(1998).
14Even if b does not follow (2) but continues to increase, the transversality condition
holds and the money multiplier remains unity as long as the expansion rate of b is less
than that of m.
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Note that (32)-(34), (37) and (38) are valid regardless of the amount of
M . Thus, even if the monetary authority supplies a larger amount of M ,
all of the real variables remain unaffected and only nominal cash and excess
reserve holdings increase. It is indeed the case during Japan’s recent long-run
stagnation. The Bank of Japan expanded the monetary base from 65.7961
trillion yen in March 2001 to 108.7749 trillion yen in March 2006 but most
of the increased money were absorbed as excess reserves (see figure 4) while
neither aggregate demand nor employment was significantly stimulated.
6 Concluding Remarks
We present a simple model where a representative household derives utility
from liquidity of both cash and deposits, a representative commercial bank
is required to hold money as reserves, and nominal wages sluggishly adjust.
In this setting we find that there are a certain value of the marginal utility
of cash and a certain amount of full-employment output that divide the case
of persistent unemployment from that of full employment.
If the marginal utility of cash is less than the critical value, or equiv-
alently, if full-employment output is smaller than the critical amount, full
employment obtains and nominal interest rates are positive in a steady state.
If otherwise, typical phenomena of persistent stagnation that are allegedly
due to a liquidity trap obtain in a steady state. Nominal interest rates are
stuck at zero and the commercial bank holds excess reserves. The marginal
benefit of cash would be larger than that of consumption if the household
consumed enough to realize full employment. Therefore, the household re-
duces consumption so as to increase cash holdings, which creates an aggre-
gate demand shortage, unemployment and deflation. These phenomena were
common during the Great Depression in the US and the recent long-run
18
stagnation in Japan.
The present mechanism of stagnation is more in conformity with the
spending hypothesis than with the money hypothesis although the monetary
side plays a crucial role in generating stagnation. The stagnation occurs
– not because excessive demand for cash decreases monetary aggregates,
keeps an interest rate too high and prevents investment from increasing – but
because it absorbs purchasing power that would otherwise be directed toward
consumption and generates a shortage of aggregate demand. Furthermore,
this mechanism is different from such recent studies of liquidity traps as
Krugman (1998) who shows that a combination of deflation and zero nominal
interest rates increases real interest rates and decreases current consumption.
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Appendix A The Stability of the Full Employ-
ment Steady State
In the neighborhood of the steady state where b, m and c are given by
(28) and (30), linearizing (2), (23) and the first equation of (26) yields the
characteristic equation:
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−θ − z 0 0
0 −z −αm
y
σcv′mxb
u′
σcv′mxm
u′
σc
(
−α
y
− vm
u′2
u′′
)
− z
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 0,
where z is a characteristic root and xb and xm are partial derivatives of the
first equation of (24):
xb = −(1− )m
b2
< 0, xm =
1− 
b
> 0.
One of the three characteristic roots is
z = −θ < 0,
and the other two satisfy
z2 + σc
(
α
y
+
vm
u′2
u′′
)
z +
αmσcv′mxm
yu′
= 0,
where the constant term is negative. Thus, the characteristic equation has
one positive and two negative roots.
From (19), P0 is determined so that W0/P0 = y, where W0 is historically
given. Then, m0 and b0 are given as m0 = yM/W0 and b0 = yB0/W0, where
y and M are exogenous and constant and B0 is historically given. Since c0
is jumpable and m0 and b0 are not, there is a unique path converging to the
full employment steady state mentioned in proposition 1.
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Appendix B The Stability of the Unemploy-
ment Steady State
By replacing mt by qt (≡ 1/mt) and linearizing (2), (23) and the second
equation of (26) in the neighborhood of the steady state where q = 0, b = b
and c satisfies (34), we obtain the following characteristic equation:
−θ − z 0 0
0 α
(
c
y
− 1
)
− z 0
0 0 σc
(
−α
y
− vm
u′2
u′′
)
− z
= 0.
The roots of this equation are
z = −θ < 0, z = α
(
c
y
− 1
)
< 0, z = σc
(
−α
y
− vm
u′2
u′′
)
> 0,
where the last inequality holds under (36). Note that (36) must hold under
(31) and (35). Since c0 is jumpable but neither q0 (= 1/m0) nor b0 is,
there is a unique path to reach the unemployment steady state described in
proposition 2.
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Figure 1: The average rate of unemployment in Japan for the years 1990-
2007.
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Figure 2: The year-to-year percentage change in the GDP deflator in Japan
from January-March 1995 to July-September 2007.
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Note: Ordinary deposits and installment savings correspond to demand and
time deposits respectively.
Figure 3: The nominal rates of interest on deposits from October 17, 1994
to September 24, 2007.
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Figure 4: The monetary base, cash, and actual and required reserves in Japan
from January 1990 to October 2007.
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Sources: The Bank of Japan.
Note: The left and right axes measure the ratios and the money multiplier
respectively.
Figure 5: The money multiplier, the cash-deposit ratio and the reserve-
deposit ratio in Japan from January 1990 to October 2007.
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